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RECOMMENDATIONS
\ Provide assistance and incentives to 
fulfil reporting requirements 
States that are willing to fulfill their reporting 
requirements but lack the capacities to do so should 
be offered international assistance. Likewise, meeting 
the reporting commitments should play a role when 
assessing potential cooperation partners on the 
international arms market.
\ Voluntary information needed to 
continuously raise reporting standards
Several states provide voluntary information beyond 
the minimum standards. To contribute to the much-
needed improvement of the reporting system and 
to strengthen the norms and rules of the ATT, more 
States Parties—particularly EU Member States—should 
offer additional information in their next annual 
reports. 
\ Transparency as a precondition for an 
effective ATT
The ATT (Arms Trade Treaty) as such does not 
automatically end irresponsible arms exports. 
Governments and civil society organizations must 
challenge arms transfer practices that they consider 
in violation of the ATT. Transparent reporting on 
arms transfers is the basis for this, but the first round 
of annual reports shows that much work needs to 
be done to make the ATT reporting system work 
effectively.
\ Standardize templates
The central parameters of the reporting template—
actual/authorized transfers, number/value of 
transfers, reporting period, central definitions of 
weapon categories—must be standardized so that the 
information contained in the reports can be compared. 
The use of these templates must be mandatory. 
\ Make public reporting mandatory
Public reporting—also on the transfer of small arms 
and light weapons—should also be mandatory. If 
governments want to withhold information on 
particular transfers, they should at least be explicit 
about this and provide an explanation.
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The irresponsible proliferation of conventional weap-
ons accelerates and prolongs violent conflicts world-
wide, leads to regional instability, hinders socio- 
economic developments and is detrimental to the 
prevention of human rights abuses. The international 
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which entered into force on 
24 December 2014, tries to regulate the trade in con-
ventional weapons by setting global norms and stand- 
ards. 134 states have signed the Treaty, 87 have ratified it 
and implemented its criteria into national law. 
The second Conference of States Parties (CSP2), held 
from 22 to 26 August 2016 in Geneva, which was  
attended by 109 governments and non-governmental 
organizations, documented the continued transfer of 
conventional weapons to states where conflicts and 
civil wars are ongoing, such as South Sudan, Yemen, 
Libya, Iraq, Ukraine and Syria. These weapons, exported 
mostly by States Parties to or Signatories of the ATT 
are also used to violate human rights. For example, 19 
States Parties and three Signatories, among them 
many EU Member States, supplied arms and authorized 
transfers to Saudi Arabia, despite its repeated breaches 
of international humanitarian and human rights law 
in Yemen. Against this background, some critics of 
the ATT consider this emerging international regime 
regulating the international arms trade to be a tooth-
less tiger. These critics are right inasmuch as the 
rules of the ATT are still too vague, and hence, the lee-
way for governments to make export decisions on the 
basis of national interest rather than on the basis of 
international norms, is much too wide.
But they are wrong to conclude that the whole ATT  
endeavour is a failure despite the fact that the ATT as 
such has not automatically led to the cessation of  
irresponsible arms exports. It rather tells us that 
there is still much work to do to make the ATT regime 
work effectively. One central task is to establish a  
reporting system that increases the transparency of 
the international arms trade and that provides the 
basis for the much-needed debate about the applica-
tion of the ATT criteria to legitimate arms transfers. 
Governments and civil society organizations must 
challenge arms transfer practices of states that they 
deem to be in violation of the ATT. While this does 
not guarantee a strict application of the criteria, it 
puts pressure upon those governments that care 
about the legitimacy of their actions and their record 
as reliable cooperation partners. Transparent reporting 
on arms transfers can serve as a rudimentary system 
for verifying whether States Parties comply with the 
rules of the ATT or not. It allows a government to 
demonstrate its adherence to ATT obligations. This 
has an intergovernmental confidence-building effect, 
and information about a rapid and imbalanced accu-
mulation of weapons can even act as an early warning 
signal for potentially violent conflicts.
The central instruments of the ATT to increase trans-
parency of international arms transfers are the annual  
reports on arms imports and exports that States Parties 
are required to submit once a year (ATT, Article 13). For 
2015, the deadline for submission was 31 May 2016. All 
States Parties to the ATT are required to report on the 
import and export of heavy weapons systems that are 
equivalent to the seven categories of the UN Register 
of Conventional Arms (UNROCA): Battle tanks,  
armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery  
systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, 
missiles and missile launchers. Reporting on small 
arms and light weapons (SALW) is voluntary. 
An analysis of the first round of annual reports  
reveals considerable gaps and reporting deficits; in 
particular with regard to the number of reports deliv-
ered on time, the concealment of information, missing 
transfers, the comparability and the level of detail in 
the reports. These deficits are in part due to states’ 
unwillingness to disclose information on their arms 
transfers, but there are also several problems that are 
inherent to the existing reporting system. Unfortu-
nately, States Parties did not make much progress in 
overcoming these problems at the CSP2. Those gov-
ernments interested in increased transparency and 
an ATT that has concrete effects upon a state’s arms 
transfer decisions have several policy options: Setting 
concrete incentives for good reporting practices, lead-
ing by example and improving the existing reporting 
template. 
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Delivered reports: Only 34 of 64 
In all, 64 States Parties were due to submit reports 
about their national arms transfers by 31 May 2016. 
Only 34 countries, slightly more than one-half of 
these have done so. Since then, the total has grown to 
47 States Parties that have submitted their annual  
reports. More than 80 percent of all States Parties that 
have not submitted their country reports are in Africa, 
Latin America and the Caribbean. However, Malta and 
Estonia belong to this group, too, and other EU Mem-
ber States (Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Denmark, Croatia and Poland) submitted their reports 
weeks or months after the deadline.
Furthermore, the cut-off date for collected statistics is 
not standardized. 40 countries used the end of 2015. 
The Dominican Republic, Finland and Romania, how-
ever, chose 31 May 2016, Germany 14 April 2016 and 
Poland 10 August 2016. In consequence, the temporal 
scope of the reports on national arms transfers varies, 
making a comparison harder.
While the failure to meet the deadline for the annual 
reports in 2016 might be excused due to the short 
time, the ratio of states reporting on time must im-
prove in 2017 and the following years. A double-track 
policy by those states that are interested in increased 
transparency could be helpful in achieving this goal. 
The first element of such a double-track policy would 
be an offer of assistance to states having problems to 
fulfil their reporting requirements due to a lack of  
capacities or expertise. EU Member States, which are 
experienced in reporting on arms transfers in the 
framework of the EU Common Position on Arms  
Exports agreed upon in 2008, are well-positioned to 
share their professional expertise. 
At CSP2, states agreed to establish a Voluntary Trust 
Fund to support national export and import control 
systems. Some States Parties committed themselves 
to providing financial resources to implement the 
Trust Fund, including the Netherlands, Sweden, Swit-
zerland and Germany, who pledged they would donate 
€500,000 upon its establishment. These funds could 
be used to assist States Parties that are willing to fulfil 
their reporting requirements but lack the capacities 
to do so. 
The second element of a double-track policy to im-
prove reporting morale is that States Parties that do 
not live up to their reporting commitments—in spite 
of (offered) international assistance—have to face 
consequences with regard to their reputation as part-
ners on the international arms market. The timely 
delivery of annual reports should play a role in a 
state’s assessment of potential cooperation partners 
on the international arms market. Ultimately, other 
States Parties to the Treaty could refuse to grant  
export licenses to states that continuously do not 
meet reporting requirements under the ATT. Of 
course, such a policy should be matched by similar 
considerations with regard to ATT membership as 
such. Otherwise, this would be a disincentive to join 
the ATT in the first place.
Public reporting is needed as a  
precondition for transparency 
Assessing whether or not states conform to their  
reporting commitments—and to the rules of the ATT 
in general—is not only a matter for governments. Civil 
society organizations and researchers can play an im-
portant role by providing analyses of states’ reporting 
practices and their adherence to the criteria of the 
Treaty. Therefore, it is crucial that the reports be made 
public. It is counterproductive that Slovakia and Mol-
dova made their reports confidential. At the CSP2, 
Moldova explained that it had mistakenly made its 
annual report confidential and that it would change 
it. Slovakia did not comment on this issue. Other 
states declared parts of their report to be confidential 
and hence inaccessible to the public. The annual im-
port reports by Uruguay and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
are not publicly available, only for States Parties to 
the ATT. 
In addition, commercially sensitive and national  
security-related data can be excluded in accordance 
with Article 13(3) of the Treaty. From the 45 States 
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Conference of States Parties that will be held in Gene-
va from 11 to 15 September 2017 and try again to make 
public reporting mandatory. At least, the Working 
Group on Transparency and Reporting that was set 
up to continue the work on the reporting templates, 
should discuss the proposal for States Parties to pro-
vide an explanation for withholding information.
Missing transfers and deviations 
in data 
States Parties also have the option to submit so-called 
NIL reports. These reports serve to confirm that no 
exports or imports of conventional weapons listed in 
Article 2(1) of the Arms Trade Treaty haven taken 
place during the reporting period from or to the terri-
tory of the respective state. 11 States Parties (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Latvia, Liberia, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Mexico,  
Samoa, Senegal and Uruguay) submitted NIL reports 
for conventional arms exports. Four States Parties did 
so for their national imports (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Ireland, Samoa and Croatia). An analysis of submitted 
annual reports reveals, however, that some of these 
states did in fact import weapons. Ireland, for example, 
imported missile launchers (type RBS-70) from Sweden, 
according to the Swedish report. The government of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted NIL reports on 
the national export and import of conventional weap-
ons in 2015, but the annual report of Serbia lists the 
import of 540 large calibre artillery systems from  
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
France and Sweden described all national arms imports 
of the seven heavy weapons categories with NIL but 
did not use the provided template. Yet, detailed infor-
mation from other county reports indicates that both 
states heavily imported conventional weapons sys-
tems in 2015. Deviations between the stated values of 
arms exports and imports as well as uncharted trans-
fers can be documented in almost every report. To 
give two more examples, the Czech Republic did not 
report the import of 156 large calibre artillery systems 
(mortar 82mm) that are listed within the annual 
Parties that submitted publicly available reports, nine 
states (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Dominican 
Republic, Germany, Liberia, Macedonia, Senegal, Croatia 
and Sweden) used the tick-box to show that they 
withheld details of some arms transfers. This option 
of withholding information on certain transfers  
increases the opacity of the international arms trade. 
What is even worse, providing information about the 
concealment of important security-related informa-
tion is voluntary. Eight States Parties, including seven 
EU Member States (Austria, Poland, France, Slovenia, 
Spain, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom) did not 
provide any information on whether their submitted 
annual reports withheld data on arms transfers or not.
The need for transparency was voiced at this year’s 
CSP General Debate by more than 20 speakers of 
countries all over the world. France, Germany, Switzer-
land, Romania, Austria, Ireland and the Netherlands 
each made explicit calls for public reporting. New 
Zealand said that should the Conference decide to 
keep the tick box that allows States Parties to make 
their reports private, then States that do so ought to 
provide an explanation for this. However, states at the 
CSP2 were not willing to agree on mandatory public 
reporting, falling short of pre-Conference expectations. 
As long as governments have complete discretion 
over the exclusion of any kind of information, the re-
porting system is not truly transparent. Those states 
that spoke out in favour of public reporting should 
join forces in the preparation for the third 
Table 1  
First round of annual reporting 2016
States Parties
Due to submit annual reports 64
Annual reports delivered on time 34
Annual reports delivered by 30 September: 47
Not publicly availablel 2
Import report confidential 2
No import report: 4
Data withheld in accordance with Art. 13 (3) 9
No information about data withheld 8
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was adopted at CSP1. 41 countries used the provisional 
version. Only Australia, France, Senegal and the United 
Kingdom used own templates, which are characterized 
by a lack of information and a confusing layout. This 
makes it extremely difficult to compare a country’s 
list of conventional weapons with that of another. 
Senegal, for example, did not categorize its import of 
major weapon systems and SALW according to the 
UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) and 
provided no information on the exporting country. 
Even States Parties that used the provisional reporting 
template had problems to fulfil the minimum level of 
reporting requirements. Macedonia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro and Jamaica added up the 
number and financial value of the national transfer 
of controlled items in 2015, and they listed the im-
porting and exporting states all together in the same 
column. Norway and Liberia frequently used “various” 
to characterize their arms suppliers and recipients. 
Denmark noted “multiple importing/exporting 
states” in its report about transferred SALW. In sum, 
the lack of a mandatory, standardized reporting tem-
plate allowed states to use different measurement 
categories for the provided data, which significantly 
compromises the comparability of the reports.
At least—with the exception of Senegal—all states 
that have submitted a report so far stick to the seven 
UNROCA categories for heavy weapons. To compare 
SALW transfers is more difficult. Almost every sub-
mitted annual report—apart from Uruguay and South 
Africa—contains information about the import and 
export of SALW. However, six countries (Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Japan, Senegal and Sweden) did not 
report in accordance with the UN definition of SALW 
sub-categories. Reporting on the transfers of SALW is 
voluntary but significant for the future success of 
preventing the irresponsible and the illicit trade in 
weapons. Consequently, it should be a central goal for 
CSP3 to make reporting on SALW mandatory—based 
on the UN definition of SALW and their sub-categories. 
Of course, this should not prevent states from providing 
additional information on their SALW transfers, as 
Germany and New Zealand did in their reports.
export report of Albania. Switzerland exported seven 
armoured combat vehicles to Romania that do not 
show up in the Romanian report. 
Similar disparities can be found with regard to small 
arms and light weapons (SALW). Slovenia, for example, 
only reported the export of revolvers and self-loading 
pistols to Korea, Zambia, Singapore and the United 
States and classified its national import with NIL. 
However, information from other country reports 
show Slovenian exports to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary and Macedonia, 
as well as Slovenian imports of SALW from Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Switzer-
land, Finland and the United Kingdom.
Substantial gaps are also reflected in the annual reports 
of Australia, Austria, Spain and the United Kingdom 
that do not contain any information on imports of 
weapons. This illustrates significant deficits with regard 
to compliance with formal reporting requirements. Yet, 
there was not one single critical statement from gov-
ernments at the CSP2 regarding current reporting prac-
tices. Instead, they focused on administrative and pro-
cedural subjects such as establishing working groups 
and the Voluntary Trust Fund, the appointment of a 
Permanent Head of the Secretariat and several decisions 
concerning the next CSP in Geneva 2017.
While these findings raise doubts about the willing-
ness of states to truly increase transparency of the  
international arms trade, they do illustrate the value 
and the potential of the ATT reporting mechanism: 
Through a comparison with reports of other states, 
incongruences come to light. When arms transactions 
are in the public domain, governments that authorized 
irresponsible transfers face a higher risk of exposure 
and criticism.
Divergence complicates the  
monitoring of reported data
Because States Parties failed to agree on reporting 
templates during the first CSP, only a provisional, 
non-obligatory reporting template for annual reports 
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the export of two combat aircraft, 15 attack helicopters 
and ten missile launchers to Italy in 2015—but its an-
nual report includes no information as to whether 
the report is about authorized or actual transfers. 
Thus, we cannot know for sure—at least not from the 
data provided by the two ATT reports of Italy and the 
United Kingdom—whether the transfer of the combat 
A major challenge to the comparability of the reports 
is the fact that States Parties can choose whether to 
report on either authorized or actual im- and exports 
of conventional weapons. The choice can be made for 
the report as a whole or category by category. 
Concerning the export of major weapons systems, 
five reports inform about authorized exports while 21 
countries reported actual exports. South Africa reported 
both, but summarized authorized and actual imports 
in one table. Italy reported on authorized exports but 
actual imports. France and the United Kingdom, two 
major arms exporters, did not even specify whether 
the data reported was about authorized or actual 
transfers. 
This divergence complicates the monitoring of  
reported data. Italy, for example—reporting on actual 
imports of major weapons systems—, documented 
only the import of combat aircraft and missiles from 
the United States. The United Kingdom in turn reported 
aircraft, attack helicopters, and missile launchers has 
not yet occurred, or whether Italy has not reported it.
Similar disparities exist concerning the export of 
SALW. Of the 42 states that did report on their SALW 
transfers, 26 States Parties reported actual arms  
exports, eleven reported authorizations. While three 
annual reports (Bosnia and Herzegovina, United 
Kingdom and France) provided no information, 
Austria reported actual and authorized SALW exports. 
It is obvious that the comparability of information 
suffers when the categories differ between the report- 
ing states. Governments at the CSP3 should agree on a 
mandatory standardized reporting template so that 
the data of all annual reports can be compared. In the 
best case, states would report on the authorized and 
on the actual transfers. But at minimum, they should 
agree to report consistently.
Another issue is the question of whether states indi-
cate the size of exports and imports either as quantity, 
i.e. as number, of transferred weapons, or as their  
financial value. Currently, all 27 States Parties that  
reported transfers of heavy weapons provided the 
numbers. Only three reports (Austria, Portugal and 
Slovenia) included information on both, the value 
and number of heavy weapons exported. Austria, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Japan, Luxembourg, Monte-
negro, Portugal and Slovenia voluntary reported on 
the number and value of exported small arms and 
light weapons. Belgium and Sweden reported just the 
financial value, while 33 other States Parties reported 
just on the number of SALW exported. States should 
agree to report on the number of transferred 
weapons, as these are more meaningful in terms of 
fighting power than the financial value of certain 
arms transfers, because prices might strongly diverge.
Table 2 
Divergence of reporting
Reporting Major weapons systems SALW
Number of states that  
reported on transfers
30* 42
Authorized transfers 5 11
Actual transfers 21 26
Both 2** 2
No information 2 3
Number of items 27 33
Financial value 0 2
Number and value 3 7
NIL export report 11 -
NIL import report 4 -
* Of the 45 States Parties that submitted public annual reports, only 30 
transferred major weapons systems.
** Italy is listed under both because it reported authorized exports and  
actual imports.
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Government and noted when weapons were trans-
ferred to UN-Missions. New Zealand commented on 
involved brokering firms. 17 European countries (such 
as Poland, the Netherlands, Romania and Germany) 
provided a detailed description of transferred items. 
The Dominican Republic submitted voluntary infor-
mation about the total value of transferred muni-
tions, attachments, parts and components. Norway 
provided data on the value of exported ammunition. 
More than ten States Parties (among them New Zealand, 
Argentina, Costa Rica, Jamaica and Mexico) reported 
details on shotguns, hunting rifles and other SALW. 
Senegal, one of the few African ATT States Parties, 
informed about the number and model of imported 
ammunition and attachments. Sweden provided a plu-
rality of additional information concerning its ex-
ports: In 25 categories, it listed, inter alia, ammunition, 
attachments, other weapons systems like bombs and 
torpedoes, equipment, software and technology. 
This is a positive development, and it underlines ex-
perience from UNROCA that has shown that states 
use the optional segment of the reporting template to 
voluntarily go beyond the minimum standards. More 
States Parties—particularly EU Member States—
should offer additional information in their next  
annual reports in order to continuously raise reporting 
standards. Such a policy of leading by example, in 
combination with a constant improvement of the  
reporting template and the setting of incentives for 
good reporting practices by major arms producing 
countries, can contribute to the much-needed im-
provement of the reporting system. This would increase 
the transparency of the international arms trade and 
could help to strengthen the norms and rules of the 
ATT so that they will have a visible impact on states’ 
arms transfer policies.
FURTHER READING
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 A Working Group on Reporting had been set up with 
the task of preparing a final reporting template for 
consideration at the CSP2. At the CSP2, governments 
only discussed the status, rather than the content, of 
reporting templates. States Parties agreed to ‘endorse’ 
both the initial and annual reporting templates, ‘rec-
ommend’ their use and keep the option open to amend 
the templates in future. But in the new reporting 
template, adopted by consensus, only some wordings 
were changed. The outlined content problems were 
not resolved. A standardized and useable format for 
annual reports is the precondition for an effective 
comparison of country data. In particular, the central 
parameters of the information on arms transfers— 
actual/authorized, number/value, report period, central 
definitions of weapon categories—must be standard-
ized in a mandatory reporting template. Paving the 
way for States Parties to agree on such a reporting 
template at CSP3 should be a major task of the 
Working Group on Transparency and Reporting. If 
the current reporting confusion continues, the poten-
tial of the ATT reporting mechanism to increase 
transparency of the international arms trade cannot 
be realized. It is especially disappointing that even 
the EU Member States did not succeed to come up 
with a consistent reporting scheme. As major arms 
exporters, in particular, France, Germany and the 
United Kingdom should lead this process.
Leading by example: Additional  
information on a voluntary basis
Unfortunately, no annual report contains voluntary 
references to denials of arms export licenses, the 
transfer of production licenses, arms manufacturing 
equipment, involved arms producing companies or 
on transit countries and routes. However, as a closer 
look into the reports shows, several states voluntarily 
provided additional information. 29 reports included 
detailed descriptions of weapon types. 22 countries 
commented on the end-user and the condition of 
weapons. Germany, for example, stated that the listed 
SALW to Iraq were for the Kurdistan Regional 
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